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This paper reports an experimental test of asymmetric Tullock contests. Both the simultaneous-
move and sequential-move frameworks are considered. The introduction of asymmetries in the
contest function generates experimental behavior qualitatively consistent with the theoretical
predictions. However, especially in the simultaneous-move framework, average bidding levels
are in excess of the risk-neutral predictions. We conjecture that the reason behind this behavior
lies in subjects attaching positive utility to victory in the contest.
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1 Introduction
The problem of a set of agents spending e®ort in order to increase the likelihood of obtaining
a prize was ¯rst put forth by Tullock (1967) and later formalized by the same author in 1980.
¤I am particularly indebted to Hans-Theo Normann and Anthony Heyes for enlightening discussions and helpful
comments on earlier versions of this manuscript.
yCRED - Columbia University, 419D Schermerhorn MC 5501, 1190 Amsterdam Avenue, New York, NY 10027,
USA; Tel: +1 212 8548384; Fax: +1 212 854 3609; Email: mf2318@columbia.edu.
1In the latter paper, the main result was that depending on parameters of the contest, the total
amount of e®ort spent by the agents competing for a rent (which we will de¯ne as rent dissipation)
could be smaller than, equal to or larger than the value of the rent (implying under-, full or over-
dissipation of the rent.) This spawned a strand of theoretical literature so large it merited its
own historical recollection1. In addition, it also gave economists a tool by which several economic
phenomena could be modelled. Applications of this encompass sports competitions, job promotion
tournaments, warfare, litigation, in fact any activity that involves rent-seeking behavior of some
type.
Despite the proli¯c theoretical literature on contest theory either in abstract or applied
settings, it has not received much attention by experimentalists. In fact, the experimental approach
seems to be particularly well suited to test the predictions of theory, given the great di±culty in
successfully collecting the relevant data from the ¯eld. Empirical studies of rent-seeking behavior
based on real-world data would be faced with di±culties in attaining data that successfully proxies
the e®ort level variable in the standard Tullock contest model. Additionally, the question would
arise of what parameter speci¯cation would be the most appropriate for the speci¯c contest under
study, or should there be one set of parameters that should ¯t all contests? Experimental methods
allow for the controlled study of this model, and for the collection of the relevant data without any
noise spawning from external sources to the data generation process.
Most of the experimental studies on contests have focused their attention on whether the
predicted under-dissipation of rents predicted by Tullock was in fact veri¯ed. The existing evidence
is mixed; Millner and Pratt (1989), (1991) as well as Davis and Reilly (1998) conducted studies
that present evidence towards over-dissipation of rents, while Baik and Shogren (1991) present a
di®erent design that yields results consistent with the theory.
Surprisingly, most theoretical and experimental studies on contests have assumed symmetric
2players as well as simultaneous-moves. The exception in the experimental literature on Tullock
contests is Davis and Reilly (1998) who test for the e®ect of asymmetries in the value of the prize
in standard Tullock contests, as well as purely discriminating contests. The authors ¯nd that having
players with asymmetric valuations of the prize of the contest reduces the amount of overbidding but
does not completely erradicate it. They also ¯nd that experience tends to reduce the overbidding
by subjects. Weimann, Yang and Vogt (2000) is to our knowledge the only other experimental
study of sequential-move Tullock contests with ¯xed order and ¯nite number of moves2.
In reality, examples which are consistent with the assumption of symmetry may be di±cult
to ¯nd. If one considers rent-seeking activities, it is likely that one agent may have a competitive
advantage that makes her e®orts more likely to result in the attainment of the rent in question.
If one considers the example of legal con°ict, one side may be better represented in court, which
makes each dollar invested in the legal battle more e®ective than the other side's. Similarly, in a
job promotion tournament, one individual may have a better set of skills, allowing him or her to
be more productive for each hour spent, which in turn makes his or her promotion more likely.
Additionally, when considering real-world contests, the simultaneous-move framework does
not always capture the essence of the process. While in some situations, one could ¯nd a level
playing ¯eld wherein all rent-seekers have an equal start, (an easy example is the allocation of
grants by a government body or a foundation, where the announcement to all applicants is made
simultaneously) there are cases where a sequential framework may be more appropriate, especially
when one of the rent-seekers has an intrinsic advantage over the others. When lobbying in Congress,
an experienced lobbyist may have preferential access to the Congressman due to the number of years
spent in Washington getting acquainted with the system; when renewing a consulting contract, a
company may want to listen to the incumbent ¯rm's o®er before listening to any other ¯rms.
Finally, in lawsuits, the plainti® must ¯rst incur e®ort in order to hire legal counselling and in
3collecting evidence before launching the suit. The defendant can obviously only spend e®ort in the
legal battle once it knows it is being sued.
This experimental study seeks to investigate the role of asymmetries in contests. For this
purpose, we consider two di®erent timing assumptions, a game where players move simultaneously
and one where players move sequentially. The research question underlying this study is whether
the introduction of asymmetries in the contest success function would lead to bidding behavior
consistent with the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous-move case and to behavior
consistent with the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the sequential-move case.
The main ¯ndings are that in simultaneous-move contests, subjects bid over the risk-neutral
Nash equilibrium, even with the introduction of asymmetries. In the sequential-move contests, the
introduction of asymmetries helps subjects coordinate on the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
more often than in the symmetric case and more often than in previous studies. However, when
second-movers participate in the contest, they seem to choose actions that ensure a high probability
of victory, as opposed to actions that maximize their expected payo®s.
Section 2 deals with the model to be implemented. Section 3 outlines the experimental
design to be used. Section 4 contains the data analysis. A discussion of the results in Section 5
concludes.
2 The Model
The experiment will consider a two-player game, where each player selects her level of e®ort, Ei in
order to obtain a prize (Ji). The value of the contest,Vi, is given by the following equation:










The timing of the decisions and the a parameter are the treatment variables. In one variant of
the experiment, both players make their decisions simultaneously. In the other variant, one of the
players (player 1) makes his choice in the ¯rst period, and the other (player 2) makes her decision
in the second period. In the experiment Ji will be equal to 200 and the cost function will be de¯ned
as Ci = Ei.
2.1 Simultaneous Play
In the simultaneous-move game, the Nash equilibrium is found when either player is selecting a
strategy which is a best reply to the other player's strategy. This implies that when both parties









Solving them simultaneously, gives us the unique Nash equilibrium where
E1 = E2 = E =
a
(a + 1)2J;8a 6= 0 (4)
Note that both players submit the same e®ort in equilibrium for all values of a. To see the intuition
behind this, let us consider the simple symmetric case, where a is equal to 1. There, both players
have the same marginal \bene¯t" of bidding, in that the same bid by both players implies the
same probability of victory. Without loss of generality, as the a parameter increases, the only thing
that changes is the marginal probability of winning, since costs remain unaltered. Therefore, the
5bene¯tted player obtains the same probability of victory by bidding a smaller amount, whilst the
reverse applies for player 2. This means that player 2 will therefore bid a lower amount in order
to maximize its expected value of the contest, which is the always the same for both players. This
also means the Nash equilibrium bid function has its highest level of E when a = 1. Also, given
that in equilibrium both players' bids are equal, total rent dissipation will vary in a similar way to
changes in a.
2.2 Sequential Play
When calculating the Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the sequential-move game, we work by
backward induction. Thus we have the second-mover, player 2, maximize his expected value of the










J ¡ E1 = (JaE1)
1
2 ¡ E1

















6However, the second-mover will only participate if E2 > 0. If his reaction function dictates a non-
positive value for E2, then he will submit zero e®ort. We can then calculate for which values of a
will the second-mover not ¯nd it pro¯table to enter the contest. It is easy to show that E2 ¸ 0 if
and only if 0 < a · 2
For values of a greater than 2, Player 2 should always submit zero e®ort (provided Ei =
aJ=4.) Player 1 anticipates this and thus we can calculate the e®ort level that deters Player 2 from
entering the contest for values of a great than or equal to 2: (aJE1)
1
2 ¡ aE1 = 0 ) E1 = J
a.
We can now de¯ne the Subgame Perfect Equilibria as a function of a:
E1 =
8
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It is evident that predicted behavior in the sequential game is radically di®erent from the simulta-
neous game. Here, we see the equilibrium level of e®ort of the follower is higher than the one of
the leader for values of a smaller than 1. At a = 1, the e®ort levels of both players are equal. From
that point on, we see the level of e®ort of the follower in equilibrium decline until reaching zero at
a = 2, while the equilibrium level of e®ort of the leader continues to increase until the critical point
of a is also reached. At this point, the leader deters the follower from entering the contest, and
as the value of a approaches in¯nity, the equilibrium level of E1 approaches zero. Rent dissipation
rises monotonically until a ' 1:5, when aggregate e®ort reaches a maximum. This is due to the
fact that the rate of increase in the e®ort level of the leader is faster than the rate of decrease of
the follower's e®ort level, until the critical level of a is reached. Thereon, aggregate e®ort declines
until reaching zero when a approaches in¯nity. This implies that the contests which are fought the
7hardest are not the symmetric ones. Rather, the cases where aggregate e®ort is highest are when
the ¯rst-mover has an edge over the second-mover.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
The experiments will investigate the impact of the introduction of asymmetries on the e®ectiveness
of individual bids in two separate environments: simultaneous-move and sequential-move contests.
For each timing environment, we will consider two treatments. In one, which will be denominated
symmetric, player 1 will have the a coe±cient set to 1, which corresponds to the standard games. In
the other treatment, player 1 (¯rst-mover in the sequential-move treatment) will have a coe±cient3
of a = 7
3. Table 1 outlines the di®erent treatments as well as the predictions for each one.
[Table 1 about here.]
The symmetric experiments test the standard simultaneous-move Tullock contests, thus they are
the control treatments. This will also contextualize the experimental results with the existing
literature. The asymmetric treatments will be the focus of the analysis. The chosen parameters
imply that in the simultaneous play environment, both players submit the same bid, but smaller
than in the symmetric case. In the sequential-move case, the parameter asymmetry induces a corner
solution where the ¯rst-mover commits to a level of e®ort that forces the other player to drop out
of the contest.
The working hypotheses are that in the simultaneous-move case, the average symmetric bid
will be higher than the average asymmetric bid, as predicted by the theory. In addition, it will
be relevant to investigate whether both types of players will submit similar levels of e®ort in the
asymmetric case. In the sequential-move case, the hypothesis is that theory will be vindicated in
that in the asymmetric case, the ¯rst-mover will be able to commit to an e®ort level such that the
8second-mover will not ¯nd it pro¯table to enter the contest.
As for the experimental design itself, it consisted of the following. For all treatments, three
computerized sessions4 were run. In each session, ten subjects were invited to take part in an
experiment. They were undergraduate and post-graduate students from a variety of subjects from
Royal Holloway College, University of London. Individuals were recruited via e-mail and °iers
posted around the university campus. Upon arrival to the lab, they were told to select one of ten
available booths. Once everybody was seated, a set of written instructions was handed to them,
and absolute silence was requested. The instructions5 were read aloud by the experimenter and
the ¯ve subsequent minutes were allocated for a detailed study of the instruction sets and possible
questions. Once the experimenters had ensured that no subject had any queries, the experiment
was initiated.
In both symmetric and asymmetric experiments, each subject was told he was taking part
in an experiment that would last 30 rounds. There would be two types of persons, A and B. In
each round all subjects were given 300 Experimental Currency Units (ECU) and a type-A person
would be randomly matched with a type-B person. They were told they could use any part of
their endowment to bid for a prize valued at 200 ECU. The more they bid, the more likely they
were to win the prize; the more the other person bid, the less likely they were to win. They were
also informed that they would forfeit their bids regardless of winning or not. To aid them in the
computations, the software enabled subjects to calculate the probability of winning the prize, given
a pair of hypothetical bids. They were informed of the timing structure of the experiment, and were
given on-screen information about the value of the prize and their endowment in every period. In
the sequential experiments, the second-movers were also informed of the bid of the ¯rst-movers they
were matched with in that period. Each ECU was worth one pence. Each session lasted about an
hour and subjects' average payment was $11.40. All sessions were conducted between September
9and November 2003 in the Experimental Economics Laboratory in the Economics Department at
Royal Holloway University of London.
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Simultaneous-move Games
We begin by analyzing the simultaneous-move treatments. Table 2 gives average bids for subjects
in both the symmetric and asymmetric treatments. It is evident that average bids decline steadily
over the course of the experiments. It is also noticeable that the average bid for the symmetrical
players is always above the average bids for the two types of asymmetric players.
[Table 2 about here.]
Average bids in the initial stages of the experiments were much higher than the predictions for both
treatments. However, a sharp decline not only in average bids but also in their standard deviations
are also noticeable for all types of subjects over the course of the sessions. Therefore for most of
the analysis we will focus on the last third of observations6.
Additionally, in order to conduct signi¯cance test for the mean values, we will run OLS
regressions of the form E = ¯0 + ¯1Di + ²i. The dependent variable, E is individual subjects'
average e®ort level across the last ten periods and Di is a dummy variable accounting for the type
of bidder (e.g. \weak" vs \strong" or \symmetric" vs \asymmetric" bidders). The estimate of ¯1
can therefore be interpreted as the di®erence in means. To avoid the problem of non-independence
of observations within sessions, we use White-adjusted standard errors (White, 1980)7. Also, for
presentational reasons, we will only refer to the statistical signi¯cance of the regression coe±cient.
The complete breakdown of each regression is available upon request.
10Closer observation shows that average bids on the last third of the experiments are still
higher than predictions for both treatments. In addition, average bids for both types of bidders in
the asymmetric case are remarkably close (61:35 for the \weak" bidders and 62:08 for the \strong"
bidders) and indeed they are not statistically di®erent. Average bids in the simsym treatment
are also higher than predicted; when compared with the asymmetric bidders, the average bids in
simsym appear to be much higher than the average bids in the simasym8. This is our ¯rst result.
Finding 1: Average e®ort levels are above predictions in both symmetric and asymmetric
treatments.
In order to understand subjects' behavior, we now look at the distribution of bids in the
last ten periods.
[Figure 1 about here.]
For the weak bidders the modal bid was 50 with 16% of observations. Other bid levels with high
frequencies are 10 and 1 with 10% and 7.33% of observations respectively. For the strong bidders
the modal bid was 30 with 12.67% of observations. Other common bid levels were 50 and 100 with
11.33% and 10% of observations.
The bid distribution for the weak bidders has the majority of observations (66%) between
0 and 60 and the mode is between 0 and 20 with just under a third of all observations. Note
that eleven observations recorded bids of 1, while bids of 2 and 10 were recorded 9 and 15 times
respectively. This appears to demonstrate that disfavored bidders were aware of their position in
the game and therefore attempted to minimize their losses from bidding whilst giving themselves a
minuscule chance of winning. Finally, the strong bidders' distribution has the mode in the interval
[0;20] and another interval of bids with a high frequency is [81;100]. However, the distribution for
the strong bidders seems to be °atter than for the other types of subjects.
11While some \strong" subjects in the simasym treatment seem to realize that their advantage
allows them to bid a smaller amount and still give them a very good chance of winning, others seem
to want to practically guarantee their success in the contest by bidding much higher. Likewise, a
large proportion of observations shows weak bidders bidding very small levels, almost conceding
the fact that they will not have a good chance of winning but also a non-negligible fraction of
observations showing weak bidders bidding very high values, thus demonstrating a clear willingness
to obtain the prize. This is inconsistent with Nash equilibrium behavior, where both types of
players should bid equal amounts, despite the fact that on average one type will win more often.
Finding 2: E®ort levels are less dispersed in the asymmetric treatment.
Perhaps a clearer picture will emerge once the individual behavior of subjects is analyzed
more closely. The following ¯gure displays a histogram of subjects' average e®ort levels. For both
treatments, the Nash equilibrium is in the [41;60] interval, even though if one allows for a degree
of error in subjects' choices (i.e. plus or minus ten bid units) one can also consider the [21;40]
interval as admissible as Nash equilibrium for the simasym treatment.
[Figure 2 about here.]
The individual level ¯gures seem to con¯rm our initial conjecture. Behavior in the simsym treat-
ment is very dispersed, although over a quarter of subjects' average bid is in the Nash equilibrium
category. However, a substantial amount of subjects (40%) is bidding in excess of the Nash equilib-
rium prediction. In the simasym treatment, we do observe that most \strong" subjects either bid
below the Nash equilibrium predicion, or subtantially above. The \weak" subjects in the simasym
treatment seem to behave more according to Nash predictions, with just under 50% of subjects
bidding close to Nash. A small group of subjects bids on average very little, while another group
(33%) bid very high values. Clearly these subjects are not maximizing the expected value of the
12contest. Rather, it would appear that they either wish to have a good probability of victory, or
that they wish to punish the \strong" subjects for their seemingly unfair competitive advantage.
In order to ascertain what drives subjects behavior, one would require information regarding indi-
vidual ¯rst-order beliefs on the bidding levels of opponent players. Unfortunately, this data is not
available to us. We conclude the analysis of simultaneous-move treatments with the ¯nal result.
Finding 3: Average e®ort levels are higher in the symmetric treatment than in the asym-
metric treatment.
4.2 Sequential-move Games
Before beginning to analyze the sequential data, it is worth recapitulating the predictions of the
model. In the symmetric case, both players are to submit equal expenditure levels (50 units) and
in the asymmetric case where the ¯rst-mover has the advantage (a = 7
3) the predictions are that
the ¯rst-mover should spend 86 units and the second-mover should not put forward any e®ort at
all.
4.2.1 Symmetric Case
Table 3 depicts the average e®ort levels and their standard deviations by players throughout the
course of the experiments.
[Table 3 about here.]
The ¯rst observation is that unlike the simultaneous-move treatment, there is no sharp decline
of bidding values over the course of the experiment. First-movers' average bids decline over the
second third of the experiments, but rise again in the last third. Second-movers' average bids on the
contrary rise in the second third of the experiment only to fall toward the end. One should note,
however that the standard deviations do fall sharply after the ¯rst ten periods of the experiments.
13In the last ten periods of the experiments, the average expenditure by ¯rst-movers is equal
to 92.6, while the average second-mover expenditure is 76.45 units9. An additional fact that can
be easily drawn from table 3 is the high values of the standard deviations, especially for the
second-movers. It is therefore interesting to investigate further the bidding behavior of leaders and
followers in the last third of the experiment. Table 4 depicts the average reply by followers to a
range of values by ¯rst-movers. It also outlines in the last column what would the best-reply to
each observation be, averaged out across observations.
[Table 4 about here.]
The distribution of ¯rst-mover bids shows that the modal choice range is between 81 and 100, well
above the prediction of 50. However the second most chosen e®ort range is [41;60]. Also, it is worth
noting that only 26.67% of observations show ¯rst-movers choosing e®ort levels above 100. Second-
movers seem to overbid ¯rst-movers when the latter choose e®ort levels under 60, and they choose
e®ort levels similar to those chosen by ¯rst-movers when the latter set their e®orts between 60 and
100. Additionally, their bidding levels are much higher than what would be predicted by a risk
neutral best-reply function for any range of ¯rst-mover bids, which is quite clear upon inspection
of the values of the second column (the actual average bidding level) and the values of the last
column (average best-reply). For ¯rst-movers' e®ort levels higher than 100, follower behavior is
di±cult to characterize using the information available in this table, so we will continue this in the
additional analysis of the data. To have a better idea of what follower behavior was, we present a
¯gure displaying the distribution of bid pairs. The x-axis measures ¯rst-mover bids and the y-axis
measures second-mover bids.
[Figure 3 about here.]
14When ¯rst-movers choose e®ort levels under 60, the majority of second-movers bids are between
41 and 100. Note that about three quarters of second-movers submitted bids that would give them
at least an equal chance of winning the contest, just under 50% chose bids that gave them at
least 66.6% probability of winning and 12% bid such that they would have no less than a 83.33%
probability of victory. When ¯rst-movers' e®ort level are between 60 and 100, we see that the vast
majority of observations (72%) are recording second-movers' e®ort levels below 100, being that the
modal range (28%) was the one with e®ort levels between 81-100. It should be noted that only
2.83% of subjects chose a bid of zero, as opposed to 40% of second-movers who chose a level of
e®ort that would give them at least a 50% chance of winning, whilst only 3.77% of followers bid at
least twice as much as the ¯rst-movers with whom they were matched. As for the distribution of
second-movers' bids when ¯rst-movers' e®orts are in excess of 100, we see that the modal choice
is between 0 and 20. In fact, 17.39% of all second-movers chose not to participate in the contest.
Here the percentage of second-movers who bid at least as much as the ¯rst-movers declines even
further to 20.29%. However, about 30% of observations still record bid choices between 121 and
200.
Finding 4: Average e®ort levels in the SeqSym treatment are above predicted levels.
We should also note that subjects are not maximizing their expected value of the contest.
The average absolute di®erence from observed bid and the risk-neutral best-reply is 49.10 for the
¯rst sub-group, 44.50 for the second sub-group and 69.99 for the last group. If we express this in
terms of average foregone expected value these are -33.24, -17.24 and -25.47. This means that we
can divide follower behavior in this (small) subset of observations into those who choose not to
enter the contest and ensure they get the guaranteed 300 units of pro¯t for the round, or spending
a small amount of e®ort just to have a marginal probability of success and those who behave in a
15far more aggressive manner and demonstrate a far greater eagerness to win the contest.
Finding 5: Second-movers overbid relative to best-reply predictions.
Finding 5a: A substantial proportion of bids seem to be geared towards achieving a high
probability of victory in the contest rather that expected utility maximization.
4.2.2 Asymmetric Case
Let us turn our attention to the asymmetric case. Recall that the prediction is that the ¯rst-mover
should submit a bid of 86 and the second-mover should not bid at all. This was observed 28 times
out of 450 observations10. The outcome where the ¯rst-mover bids a positive amount and the
second-mover bids zero occurred 104 times out of 450, whereas if you consider the case where the
second-mover only bids a very small amount, smaller than 5, then this is observed 200 times out
of 450 observations.
In our experiment, a signi¯cant proportion of ¯rst-mover bids are close to SPNE and in
those cases, the majority of second-movers also plays according to the SPNE. Additionally, only one
observation is consistent with cooperative behavior by ¯rst-movers (where by cooperative behavior,
we mean very low bidding level, in the same spirit of collusive behavior in a Cournot market), and
extreme bidding above the predictions is only observed in 5% of all observations. This is unlike
Weimann et al. (2000) who report that the most observed outcomes were when ¯rst-movers bid
close to zero, followed by a best-reply by second-movers or when ¯rst-movers bid extreme amounts,
and second-movers bid zero.
Therefore, it would appear that the introduction of the asymmetry helps subjects to coor-
dinate on the SPNE, since punishments by second-movers become more \expensive", in that to get
an equal chance of winning, second-movers must bid 2.33 times more than ¯rst-movers.
16Finding 6: A larger proportion of observations are consistent with predictions vis-'a-vis
the SeqSym treatment.
Table 5 gives us a ¯rst look at the behavior by outlining the average bids by both types of
subjects over time.
[Table 5 about here.]
This time, we observe a steady decline in average bids by both types of players as the experiment
goes on. Also, it is noticeable that average ¯rst-mover behavior is always higher than second-
mover behavior, including the last third of the experiment11. This decline in average bids is also
accompanied by a sharp decline in standard deviations, especially in the ¯rst-movers' case. However,
it is readily noticeable that the standard deviations of the average second-mover bid are always
higher than the mean, implying a huge dispersion of values, something that is not parallelled in
the ¯rst-mover case. It is therefore important to extend the analysis of second-mover behavior,
in particular relatively to how ¯rst-movers played. Table 6 shows the relative frequency of bids
of ¯rst-mover in the last 10 periods of the experiments, as well as average bids by second-movers,
conditional on the range of bids chosen by the ¯rst-movers.
[Table 6 about here.]
The majority of bids (78.73%) are between 41 and 100 and its distribution has two peaks,
one is the interval of bids between 81 and 100, which includes the Nash equilibrium bid of this game
(86). The other encompasses bids between 41 and 60. So we can say that leaders can be divided
into 2 di®erent types: those who assume that the asymmetry in the game will enable them to win
the contest without exerting too much e®ort, and those who prefer to assert their advantage by
bidding much higher and ensuring a high probability of winning the contest. As for followers, their
average bid is higher than leaders bids if the latter bid below 60, but soon becomes much smaller
17than leaders' bids for when the latter go over 60. Still, it is still much in excess of what the average
best reply data would suggest as the optimal response. However, one should proceed with caution
when drawing any inferences from these ¯gures, because of the unusually high values of standard
deviations, which imply a very large dispersion of bids by followers. It is then important to look
at the distribution of followers' bids conditional on the choices by the ¯rst-movers.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Figure 4 gives an interesting view of subjects' behavior. As ¯rst-movers' bids increase, the propor-
tion of second-movers who choose a very small (or zero) level of e®ort increases from one quarter
to almost two thirds of observations. However, the range of second-movers' bids also increases
as leaders bids rise. When ¯rst-movers choose relatively low values of e®ort, a quarter of the
second-movers seems to settle for a relatively small bid (of which only 6.25% chose a bid of zero).
The majority choose higher e®ort levels than leaders; nevertheless, 86.66% of observations show
second-movers choosing bids which are at least 2.5 times as large as the ¯rst-mover bid12.
When ¯rst-movers bid between 21 and 60, the dispersion of second-mover bids is much
higher here, with just under 60% of second-movers choosing e®ort levels higher than 60. Also,
the proportion of second-movers who chose e®ort levels at least twice as high as the ¯rst-mover
e®ort level was 52.73%. Finally, for the range of ¯rst-mover bids higher than 60, the proportion of
second-movers who chose not to participate in the contest was 26.58% and the share of subjects
who chose to bid at most 20 units was 66.21%.
In addition, just under 23% submit bids that at least matched those of the ¯rst-movers
and 6.33% of second-mover bids were such that the probability of victory was at least 50%, which
shows that there were subjects who had a ¯rm interest in winning the contest. The most interesting
reading of these ¯gures is that second-movers are again de¯nitely not maximizing their expected
value of the contest. In fact the average di®erence between the risk-neutral best-reply and the
18observed reply was 50.03 units for the ¯rst sub-group, 38.61 in the intermediate sub-group and
40.20 for the last sub-group. This had an associated loss in expected value terms of -20.36, -14.01
and -23.03, respectively.
Finding 7: In the sequential-move treatments, overbidding seems to be mainly driven by
the objective of obtaining a high probability of victory.
5 Discussion
The research question underlying this study was whether the introduction of asymmetries in the
contest success function would lead to lower bidding behavior in the simultaneous-move case and
to behavior consistent with the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the sequential-move case.
The reasoning behind the ¯rst conjecture was that on one hand, the bene¯tted subjects would
realize that they did not have to bid very highly to have a good chance of success in the contest,
and similarly the jeopardized bidders would also see this and therefore also bid lower levels in
order to maximize their earnings in the experiments. In the sequential-move case, the conjecture
would be that the asymmetry would dampen the potential threat that second-movers could pose of
punishing ¯rst-movers who made high bids by making equally high bids, as Weimann et al. (2000)
had observed.
In the simultaneous play treatments, much like previous research, average bids are much
higher than the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium predictions. There is a high dispersion of average
bids at the individual level, especially when considering the symmetric case. The introduction of
asymmetries reduces both the average bid as well as the variance of bids.
One is left with the task of ¯nding suitable explanations for the experimental behavior thus
far reported in this paper. The ¯rst avenue of explanation could be subjects' attitudes towards
19risk. Is the assumption of risk-neutrality appropriate for this type of model? Surely the analysis
of contests would be richer if one would allow for subjects to exhibit aversion to risk. There is
however, a stumbling block concerning modelling this type of preferences into contests. Millner
and Pratt (1991) show that the Nash equilibrium of such a contest assuming risk aversion will
depend on the type of risk aversion one assumes on the players in the game, and that di®erent
types of risk aversion may lead to higher or lower equilibrium bids than the risk-neutral prediction.
An alternative explanation for the simultaneous-play data is that subjects attach some
utility to the act of winning the contest itself, which overrides the foregone gains which were
associated with the expected value maximizing bid. In fact, this argument can be encountered in
most of the real world situations we can model as contests. Consider the following examples: a
court case where each agent is a parent, and where the \object" of the contest is the custody of
the couple's children. It is very unlikely that either parent will attempt to maximize his or her
expected value from taking part in the contest. Alternatively, one could consider the case of a sports
competition of any type, say the U.S. Open. Again, each athlete is unlikely to carefully calculate
the expected utility of participating in the contest. Rather, each athlete may instead over-exert
e®ort in order to guarantee his or her success in the competition, and probably will assume her
counterpart will do so too. Finally, when competing for a promotion, a driven employee may view
the promotion not only in terms of the additional salary, but also in the increased social status
associated with the position. In all these examples there is certainly a high emotional weight on
whether one wins or loses, which may lead players in the game to behave in a di®erent way than
the risk-neutrality postulate.
In the sequential-move games, we observe that in the symmetric case, ¯rst mover behavior
is on average similar to second mover behavior. Closer inspection reveals that second movers bid
above what the risk neutral best reply function would postulate. Instead, subjects seem to choose
20bidding levels which give them a good probability of victory. When the asymmetry is introduced
in the Tullock function, behavior conforms more often to predictions, with ¯rst movers bidding
enough to induce second movers not to play a part in the contest. When this is not the case, we
again observe second movers seeking to attain a \fair" probability of victory in the contest, rather
than expected value maximization.
What can we draw from these results? It would seem that the de¯nition of the \prize" of
the contest cannot completely capture the essence of the model under study. Subjects appear to
attach a positive utility to the event of defeating their counterpart in the contest, and therefore
successfully attaining the prize. However, the introduction of asymmetries lead to a reduction in
e®ort levels in both simultaneous-move and sequential-move treatments. This can empirically be
interpreted as some type of competitive advantage in that one player can be better at rent-seeking.
This can be due to, for instance the fact that the individual has already gone through the process of
lobbying and has already mustered the connections which are necessary to more e±ciently in°uence
the decision-makers. If one is to extrapolate these results with a view to use them to analyze real-
world rent-seeking processes, then the practical implications create an interesting trade-o®. If a
government is intending to attribute a rent of some type, like a large research grant and is interested
in minimizing the amount of wasteful expenditures, it should make sure (or it would prefer that)
one of the competitors for that rent is bene¯tted (or is better than) with regards to the remainder
of the ¯eld. This obviously raises issues of equity; on one hand, a government would like to ensure
a level playing ¯eld for all entities which are competing for a public grant. On the other hand, the
socially wasteful rents implicit to the contest would ideally be kept to a minimum.
If we consider the application of this model to legal con°ict, then these ¯ndings may be
good evidence in support of the claim that there is signi¯cant over-spending in the American legal
system13. A justi¯cation for this behavior could be the emotional attachment behind winning or
21losing especially in the cases that approximate symmetry, where it would not be very discernible
to the court which side is righteous. This sentiment may be even stronger than what was observed
in the lab due to the moral and ethical implications which are intrinsic to a legal battle.
Notes
1Lockhard and Tullock (2001)
2Vogt, Weimann and Yang (2002) test an open ended sequential Tullock game.
3In the experiment, this is equivalent to player 1's bid variable being given a weight of 7 and
player 2's bid variable having a weight of 3.
4We are grateful to Urs Fischbacher for letting us use his software toolbox \z-Tree" (Fischbacher,
1999).
5The instruction sets are available from the author upon request.
6This is common to all treatments. Therefore in the data analysis, unless noted, all the data
will refer to the last 10 periods of the experiment.
7Due to the random matching of subjects across rounds, error terms resulting from an OLS re-
gression using individual average data cannot be assumed independent within sessions. The robust






where X is a k £ 1 vector of regressors and M is the number of clusters.
8Average bids in the simsym treatment are statistically di®erent (higher) at the 10% level from
the average bids in simasym both when pooling the observations from the two types of asymmetric
22bidders and when taking each of them separately.
9However, this di®erence is not statistically signi¯cant.
10The case where the follower replied to an e®ort level of 86 with a bid of either 1 or 0 was
recorded 36 times out of 450 observations. If one considers the case where the ¯rst-mover bids
within 4 units of the Nash equilibrium and the second-mover bids either 0 or 1, this is observed 63
times (14% of all observations).
11This di®erence is signi¯cant at the 10% level regarding the data from the last ten periods.
12Remember that in order for a follower to have an equal probability of winning the contest she
would have to bid 2.33 times more than the leader.
13Note that the all-pay rule is in accordance with the American legal system, as opposed to the
British system, where in general the losing party has to incur the full amount of the legal costs by
the two con°icting parties.
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A Sample Instruction Sets
Simultaneous Asymmetric Treatment Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions very carefully! Do not talk to
your neighbours and keep quiet during the entire experiment. If you have any questions, please
raise your hand, and we will answer your question privately.
In this experiment you will be given an endowment of 300 Experimental Currency Units
(ECU) in every period. You will use any part of your endowment to bid for a prize. There will
be another person bidding for the same prize. This prize is worth 200 ECU to you and the other
person. Importantly, regardless of who wins, both persons will have to pay their bids.
25So if you win the prize, your payo® is equal to your endowment plus the prize minus your
bid. If you lose, your payo® will be equal to your endowment minus your bid. Note that in the
event that both persons bid zero, neither of them will win the prize.
If you win: Payo® = Endowment + Prize - Bid
If you lose: Payo® = Endowment - Bid
The experiment will work as follows: there will be two types of persons, type A and type B
persons. There are as many type-A persons as there are type-B persons in the room. To ¯nd out
what type of person you are, please check the top right-hand corner of this instruction set.
In every round, a type-A person is randomly matched with a type-B person, and both
persons will decide how many ECU's to bid.
The more you bid, the more likely you are to win. The more the other person bids the less
likely you are to win.
Speci¯cally, each ECU a type-A person bids counts as 3 blue balls and each ECU a type-B
person bids counts as 7 red balls. All red and blue balls are put into an opaque bag, and one is
taken at random. If the chosen ball is blue, the type A person wins the prize, if the chosen ball is
red, the type B person wins the prize.
To help you compute how likely you are to win the prize, we provide you with a probability
calculator. It tells you the probability of winning the prize given the bids made by you and the
other person. You can compute this as many times as you wish.
After both persons have made their decisions, the winner will be decided and you will receive
information about your payo®s on a separate screen.
There will be 30 periods in this experiment. At the end of the experiment, we will calculate
the sum of your earnings and pay them to you in cash. 1000 ECU are worth $1.20.
Sequential Symmetric Treatment Instructions
26Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions very carefully! Do not talk to
your neighbours and keep quiet during the entire experiment. If you have any questions, please
raise your hand, and we will answer your question privately.
In this experiment you will be given an endowment of 300 Experimental Currency Units
(ECU) in every period. You will use any part of your endowment to bid for a prize. There will
be another person bidding for the same prize. This prize is worth 200 ECU to you and the other
person. Importantly, regardless of who wins, both persons will have to pay their bids.
So if you win the prize, your payo® is equal to your endowment plus the prize minus your
bid. If you lose, your payo® will be equal to your endowment minus your bid. Note that in the
event that both persons bid zero, neither of them will win the prize.
If you win: Payo® = Endowment + Prize - Bid
If you lose: Payo® = Endowment - Bid
The experiment will work as follows: there will be two types of persons, type A and type B
persons. There are as many type-A persons as there are type-B persons in the room. To ¯nd out
what type of person you are, please check the top right-hand corner of this instruction set.
In every round, a type-A person is randomly matched with a type-B person. Then in the
¯rst part of the round, the type-A persons will decide how much they should bid. After the type-A
person have submitted their bid, it will be the turn of the type-B persons to make their decision
after knowing the bid of the type-A their are matched with.
The more you bid, the more likely you are to win. The more the other person bids the less
likely you are to win.
Speci¯cally, each ECU a type-A person bids counts as 1 blue ball and each ECU a type-B
person bids counts as 1 red ball. All red and blue balls are put into an opaque bag, and one is
taken at random. If the chosen ball is blue, the type A person wins the prize, if the chosen ball is
27red, the type B person wins the prize.
To help you compute how likely you are to win the prize, we provide you with a probability
calculator. It tells you the probability of winning the prize given the bids made by you and the
other person. You can compute this as many times as you wish.
After type-B persons have made their decisions, the winner will be decided and you will
receive information about your payo®s on a separate screen.
There will be 30 periods in this experiment. At the end of the experiment, we will calculate
























































































































































































































































Figure 4: Plot of the distribution of followers' bids conditional on leaders' bids - seqasym treatment
30Treatment Name Move Order Symmetry Prediction Rent Diss.
(Player 1, Player 2)
simsym Simultaneous Symmetric (50,50) 100
simasym Simultaneous Asymmetric (42,42) 84
seqsym Sequential Symmetric (50,50) 100
seqasym Sequential Asymmetric (86,0) 86
Table 1: Theoretical predictions for the di®erent treatments
Periods 1-10 11-20 21-30 All
E (Symmetric bidders) 119.5 95.36 85.4 100.08
(75.96) (63.45) (52.54) (66.19)
E (\Weak" bidders) 100.93 69.12 61.35 77.13
(95.42) (76.70) (57.00) (79.66)
E (\Strong" bidders) 115.51 81.19 62.08 86.26
(85.56) (69.68) (39.87) (71.12)
(Standard deviations in parenthesis)
Table 2: Average e®ort levels over time | simsym and simasym treatments
Periods 1-10 11-20 21-30 All
(1st mover) 100.08 81.84 92.60 91.51
(84.30) (56.38) (56.30) (67.24)
(2nd mover) 75.55 82.31 76.45 78.10
(72.98) (53.20) (55.58) (61.16)
(Standard deviations in parenthesis)
Table 3: Average e®ort levels by subject type | seqsym treatment
311st mover E avg 2nd mover E st dev # of obs % Statistical BR
0-20 46 17.92 10 6.67 37.13
21-40 63.24 13.22 17 11.33 48.36
41-60 86.24 36.7 33 22 49.78
61-80 75.6 25.66 10 6.67 48.19
81-100 83 53.84 40 26.67 41.88
101-120 162.25 43.44 4 2.67 37.31
121-140 45 62.25 5 3.33 32.21
141-160 35.73 52.48 11 7.33 24.01
161-180 170 . 1 0.67 13.47
181-200 96.5 98.27 16 10.67 2.36
201-220 . . 0 0 .
221-240 14.5 20.51 2 1.33 0.00
241-260 . . 0 0 .
261-280 0 . 1 0.67 0.00
281-300 . . 0 0 .
Table 4: Average second-mover bids conditional of ¯rst-mover's bid | seqsym treatment
Periods 1-10 11-20 21-30 All
First Mover E 99.01 71.45 64.13 78.2
(71.12) (42.85) (30.03) (53.04)
Second Mover E 71.65 56.59 53.46 60.57
(91.74) (72.21) (61.78) (76.5)
(Standard deviations in parenthesis)
Table 5: Average bid levels | seqasym treatment
First-mover E Second-mover E st dev # of obs % Statistical BR
0-20 44.69 29.74 16 10.69 42.20
21-40 87.45 58.1 11 7.33 46.00
41-60 77.55 66.06 44 29.36 35.56
61-80 38.2 62.72 25 16.69 14.01
81-100 36.2 57.79 49 32.68 0.07
101-120 15 21.21 2 1.34 0.00
121-140 10 . 1 0.67 0.00
141-160 80.5 112.43 2 1.34 0.00
161-180 . . . 0 0.00
181-200 . . . 0 0.00
201-300 . . . 0 0.00
Table 6: Average second-mover bids conditional on ¯rst-mover's bid | seqasym treatment
32